A Dynamic Incentive: Estimating the Effects of Bonuses Over Time, Duration and Across Peers for Workers in the Field

(with Kathryn Vasilaky)

We implement a five-week-long randomized bonus study with strawberry workers on a large farm in Central California to test both the own and peer impacts of varying workers' bonus pay within a crew at different times of the day for different durations.

Urban Sprawl and the Dangers of Public Provision of Fire Suppression

(with Jason Lepore)

Population growth in the wildland urban interface (WUI) has put a greater number of houses at risk due to wildfire while often straining the resources of fire suppression agencies and contributing to a dramatic increase in wildfire suppression expenditures. In light of these facts, this paper analyzes the consequences of the public provision of fire suppression when wildfire risk is endogenously determined through the choice of where to live.

Demand Uncertainty Leads to Diverse Collusive Dynamics

(with Christopher Knittel and Jason Lepore)

This paper examines the nature of collusion in a price setting duopoly with stochastic demand and exogenous capacity constraints. We provide conditions for collusive equilibria to include periods of asymmetric pricing and for those asymmetric pricing equilibria to yield the greatest profit.

An Experimental Comparison of Standard and All-Loss All-Pay Auctions

(with Jason Lepore and Blake Allison)

We compare bidding behavior in the standard complete information all-pay auction with an all-loss all-pay auction in which subjects bid to avoid a penalty.

Equilibrium Tipping in Games with Strategic Complementarities

(with Jason Lepore)

We state conditions necessary to tip a supermodular game from an inferior equilibrium to the Pareto optimal equilibrium through either precommittment by one or more agents or through government subsidization. The results are applied to macroeconomic models of coordination failure.